In this paper I attempt to answer the question: What is interdisciplinary communication? I attempt to answer this question, rather than what some might consider the ontologically prior question—what is interdisciplinarity (ID)?—for two reasons: (1) there is no generally agreed-upon definition of ID; and (2) one’s views regarding interdisciplinary communication have a normative relationship with one’s other views of ID, including one’s views of its very essence. I support these claims with reference to the growing literature on ID, which has (...) a marked tendency to favor the idea that interdisciplinary communication entails some kind of ‘integration’. The literature on ID does not yet include very many philosophers, but we have something valuable to offer in addressing the question of interdisciplinary communication. Playing somewhat fast-and-loose with traditional categories of the subdisciplines of philosophy, I group some philosophers—mostly from the philosophy of science, social–political philosophy, and moral theory—and some non-philosophers together to provide three different, but related, answers to the question of interdisciplinary communication. The groups are as follows: (1) Habermas–Klein, (2) Kuhn–MacIntyre, and (3) Bataille–Lyotard. These groups can also be thought of in terms of the types of answers they give to the question of interdisciplinary communication, especially in terms of the following key words (where the numbers correspond to the groups from the previous sentence): (1) consensus, (2) incommensurability, and (3) invention. (shrink)

This essay argues that political, economic, and cultural developments have made the twentieth century disciplinary approach to philosophy unsustainable. It (a) discusses the reasons behind this unsustainability, which also affect the academy at large, (b) describes applied philosophy as an inadequate theoretical reaction to contemporary societal pressures, and (c) proposes a dedisciplined and interstitial approach??field philosophy??as a better response to the challenges facing the twenty-first century philosophy.

Should philosophy help address the problems of non-philosophers or should it be something isolated both from other disciplines and from the lay public? This question became more than academic for philosophers working in UK universities with the introduction of societal impact assessment in the national research evaluation exercise, the REF. Every university department put together a submission describing its broader impact in case narratives, and these were graded. Philosophers were required to participate. The resulting narratives are publicly available and provide (...) a unique resource permitting a more comprehensive, empirically based consideration of philosophy’s influence outside the academy than has hitherto been possible. This paper takes advantage of this data to develop a cartography of the ways in which philosophers engage society in their work. We identify five approaches: dissemination, engagement, provocations, living philosophy, and philosophy of X. We compare these along the six dimensions proposed by Frodeman and Briggle to characterize the ideal field philosopher. We conclude that there are multiple ways of being a field philosopher, which vary in their emphasis. This pluralism bodes well for the expansion of philosophy’s societal influence, since there are routes available to suit different preferences. (shrink)

While education in ethics and the responsible conduct of research is widely acknowledged as an essential component of graduate education, particularly in the STEM disciplines, little consensus exists on how best to accomplish this goal. Recent years have witnessed a turn toward the use of games in this context. Drawing from two NSF-funded grants, this paper takes a critical look at the use of games in ethics and RCR education. It does so by: setting the development of research and engineering (...) ethics games in wider historical and theoretical contexts, which highlights their promise to solve important pedagogical problems; reporting on some initial results from our own efforts to develop a game; and reflecting on the challenges that arise in using games for ethics education. In our discussion of the challenges, we draw out lessons to improve this nascent approach to ethics education in the STEM disciplines. (shrink)

The science–society relation exhibits a tension between scientific autonomy and societal control of the direction and scope of scientific research. With the 1997 formulation of two generic merit review criteria for the assessment of National Science Foundation proposals—one for intellectual merit, and a second for ‘broader impacts’—this tension between science and society took on a unique institutional expression that has yet to work itself out into a well-accepted balance of complementary interests. This article examines some of the issues associated especially (...) with the second ‘broader impacts’ criterion. (shrink)

J Britt Holbrook - Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 676-677 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by J. Britt Holbrook University of North Texas Keith Crome. Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pp. x + 186. Cloth, $68.00. Caveat lector: this deceptively short work presents an exercise in genre-bending that may leave one's head spinning, particularly if one's acquaintance with the (...) thought of Jean-François Lyotard is not quite up to snuff. One may perhaps take the appearance of such a work—written by a Lyotard scholar for Lyotard scholars—as a sign that Lyotard has finally arrived... (shrink)

Described by Catholic World (2006) as "a treasure trove for beginning literacy" in the disciplines of science, technology, and ethics, the 2005 edition of Encyclopedia Of Science, Technology, and Ethics (ESTE) is being revised to include new analytical and interpretive essays on the events, scholarship, people, and legal decisions that have marked the period since the first edition was researched and published. In addition, to help make ESTE more global and interdisciplinary in scope and reach, the second edition will engage (...) consultants from ethics centers around the world, and will feature the revised title Ethics, Science, Technology, and Engineering: A Global Resource. Highlights of the new edition include an updated glossary and chronology, in addition to scores of new entries, hundreds of revised entries, and more than 300 graphics/images. To be published in four volumes by Macmillan Reference USA, an imprint of Gale/Cengage Learning. (shrink)

v. 1. A-D -- v. 2. E-K -- v. 3. L-R -- v. 4. S-Z.

This essay inaugurates a commitment to devote a small part of Environmental Philosophy to reflection on how environmental philosophers can better engage scientists and decisionmakers already involved in their own conversation about the environment. Philosophers generally have not made the question of how to make philosophy a relevant or useful part of their philosophical research. By way of introduction, we begin to articulate a theoretical framework for how we might integrate the humanities, philosophy in general, and environmental philosophy in particular (...) with issues of public policy via a practical engagement of scholars across the humanities in a conversation that simultaneously invites non-academics within and takes us beyond the walls of academe. (shrink)

In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry Alasdair MacIntyre issues a direct challenge to anyone who purports to defend a Nietzschean view of moral enquiry. My dissertation answers that challenge. In chapter 1, I establish the terms of the debate: I lay out MacIntyre's account of the Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean genealogical project of moral enquiry and his critique of that project. I argue that Maclntyre's critique of the genealogical project rests on an illegitimate connection between Nietzsche and Foucault. ;MacIntyre holds (...) that unless Foucault's efforts to carry on the genealogical project succeed, the genealogical project as a whole fails. He then argues that Foucault's efforts fail. In chapter 2, I argue that the Nietzschean and Foucauldian approaches to genealogy are substantially different. Yet, insofar as MacIntyre's critique of the project depends on his critique of Foucault, and insofar as Foucauldian and Nietzschean genealogy are different, MacIntyre's critique fails to defeat Nietzsche. ;MacIntyre's charge against Foucault is directed at Foucault's notion of the self: he argues that, lacking a coherent notion of the self, the genealogical project is not sustainable. In chapter 3, I give an account of the Nietzschean view of the self, a view that escapes MacIntyre's critique of Foucault. ;In chapter 4, I offer an alternative to MacIntyre's Foucauldian reading of Nietzsche. My reading focuses on the way in which Nietzsche confronts moral enquiry as a profoundly personal problem. Whereas chapter 2 deals with Nietzsche's use of genealogy as a method of moral enquiry, chapter 4 deals primarily with the approach Nietzsche outlines in Beyond Good and Evil and Ecce Homo. I conclude with the suggestion that, in place of Michel Foucault, MacIntyre might find Georges Bataille a more fittingly Nietzschean opponent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Lyotard and Greek Thought: SophistryJ. Britt HolbrookKeith Crome. Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pp. x + 186. Cloth, $68.00.Caveat lector: this deceptively short work presents an exercise in genre-bending (the sophistical retorsion of the philosophical determination of sophistry) that may leave one's head spinning, particularly if one's acquaintance with the thought of Jean-François Lyotard is not quite up to snuff. One may perhaps (...) take the appearance of such a work—written by a Lyotard scholar for Lyotard scholars—as a sign that Lyotard has finally arrived. (Arrive-t-il? But, Lyotard has already arrived! Didn't you read Keith Crome's book?) Be forewarned: unless you "got" that parenthetical joke, wait to read this book until after you have read (or re-read) at the very least Lyotard's Just Gaming and The Differend.More "sophisticated" readers of Lyotard, however, will warmly welcome this book. Along with a helpful review of secondary literature on Lyotard, the Introduction offers a compelling case for the need for an extended treatment of Lyotard's relation to Greek thought—sophistry in particular. The work sets for itself two goals: (1) to show that Lyotard's engagement with sophistry plays a key role in the development of his notion of the differend; and (2) to show that Lyotard attempts to define the limits of philosophy qua philosophy in terms of its relation to sophistry.It is this second, larger, goal that presents the main problem for the work. Because the argument "attempts to show that Lyotard wrests sophistry from the traditional philosophical understanding it has enjoyed and that by way of this effects a delimitation of philosophy [End Page 676] itself" (10), Part I ("The Place of Sophistry in Philosophy") offers accounts of traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry from Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. Essential to the success of Crome's argument is the idea that what all traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry share is both a refusal to allow sophistry to define itself and a tendency to define philosophy around and against sophistry (83). The "radicality" of Lyotard's interpretation of sophistry, according to Part II ("Lyotard and the Sophistication of Philosophy"), consists in Lyotard's refusal to allow philosophy to define sophistry and a retorsion—a turning against philosophy and for sophistry—of the philosophical tendency to define itself around and against sophistry. Crome's point exceeds the claim that, whereas traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry have invariably given sophistry a bad rap, Lyotard attempts to redress the balance and to restore the reputation of sophistry. According to Crome, Lyotard's "restoration" of sophistry to itself also puts philosophy in its place, by showing that the traditional philosophical tendency to define philosophy around and against sophistry is merely reactive—in particular, insofar as Lyotard shows that the initial move in the traditional philosophical interpretation of sophistry is motivated by a reaction against Gorgias' nihilistic reading of Parmenides' Poem (129–45).Although some may wish to quibble over individual details, overall Crome's argument is quite successful in showing that Lyotard's engagement with sophistry plays a key role in the development of his notion of the differend. It is with his second, larger goal—to show that Lyotard attempts to define the limits of philosophy as philosophy in terms of its relation to sophistry—that most readers will find something of substance with which to quarrel. Crome's interpretation of Lyotard's analysis of the sophistical "technique" —one might prefer 'manner,' in the Kantian sense—of retorsion (95–100) and its role in the development of the notion of the differend borders on brilliant; yet the insertion into that interpretation of the "ontological significance" of Lyotard's analysis (8–9, 147, 161) seems forced. In order to "broaden the significance" of Lyotard's work amongst critics, is it really necessary to attribute an "ontological significance" to The Differend? Does one really "broaden the significance" of the differend by claiming that it is "the name for a sophistical logos" (162)? Is developing a strategy to bear witness to the differend in itself insignificant? Some will balk.Nevertheless, readers of Lyotard... (shrink)